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In theory, the IMF could influence economic growth via several channels, among them advice 
to policy makers, money disbursed under its programs, and its conditionality. This paper tries 
to separate those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1970-
2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement influences economic growth in program countries. 
Consistent with the results of previous studies, it is shown that IMF programs reduce growth 
rates when their endogeneity is accounted for. There is also evidence that compliance with 
conditionality mitigates this negative effect, while the overall impact, however, remains 
negative. IMF loans have no robust statistically significant impact. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The International Monetary Fund has come under increased scrutiny and attack, with 
some of the most intense criticisms targeting the link between its programs and reduced 
economic growth in borrower countries (e.g. Przeworski and Vreeland 2000, Hutchison 
2003). The channels by which the IMF could influence growth, however, have rarely been 
made explicit. In no study those channels are separated empirically. But how could IMF 
programs, which are designed to avoid growth-damaging policies, actually achieve the 
opposite? 
In theory, the IMF can influence economic outcomes by its money, the policy 
conditions it attaches to its loans and, more generally, its policy advice. The overall effect of 
the IMF on economic growth depends on the net effect of those channels. Nevertheless, the 
literature so far made no attempt to separate them. No study did take compliance with 
conditionality adequately into account.
1 As Joyce (2004: 12) put it: 
 
“This is a surprising omission, since presumably a country’s economic 
performance will vary in response to its implementation of the 
program’s policies. Assessing the performance of program countries 
without discriminating among them by their degree of compliance 
could give a misleading view of the effects of IMF programs. On the 
other hand, if no systematic linkages exist, then new questions arise 
about the effectiveness of Fund-supported policies and the need for 
conditionality.”  
 
This paper contributes to the literature in trying to separate the effects of programs, 
disbursed loans, and compliance with conditionality on economic growth. It analyzes, 
whether implementation of IMF conditionality influences growth rates. The paper thus 
combines two strands of the literature on IMF programs: those on growth and those on 
compliance. 
What I find is, basically, that IMF programs reduce growth rates when accounting for 
self-selection into those programs. There is also evidence that compliance with conditionality 
mitigates this negative effect; IMF loans do not robustly affect economic growth.  
 
1 There are, of course, several papers including the share of money disbursed under an IMF program as 
explanatory variables (Conway 1994, Hutchison and Noy 2003, Hajro and Joyce 2004). None of them tries to 
separate the effect of advice and money from those of compliance with conditionality and none of them uses a 
more direct measure of compliance. Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2004) and Nsouli, Mourmouras and 
Atoian (2005) employ data from the Fund’s MONA database (see section 2). The former examined countries in 
transition to market economies between 1994 and 1997, the latter focus on a greater sample over the period 
1992-2000. However, the short sample employed in those studies did not allow a rigorous test of the IMF’s 
impact on long-run growth.   3
 
The next section summarizes what we know about the implementation of IMF 
conditions, the literature on the impact of the Fund on economic growth is shortly 
summarized thereafter. Section 4 discusses the various channels by which the IMF could 
influence economic growth; section 5 describes method and data employed. Section 6 
presents the empirical analysis, while the final section concludes. 
 
2. IMPLEMENTATION OF IMF CONDITIONALITY 
Measuring the implementation of IMF conditions is not straightforward. Many earlier 
studies employed proprietary data, mostly from the Fund’s internal documents. Using such 
documents, first evidence on compliance with conditionality was presented by Beveridge and 
Kelly (1980). They showed that out of 105 countries with upper-credit-tranche programs 
implemented between 1969-78 only 60 percent achieved the target for the overall fiscal deficit 
and 54 percent complied with the credit ceiling. Another study on implementation of IMF 
conditions is Haggard (1985), reporting extremely low rates of compliance with conditions 
under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) between 1974-84. Of the thirty cases studied, sixteen 
were cancelled and eight more were not implemented in their original form. Zulu and Nsouli 
(1985) found similar results in a study of African adjustment programs between 1980-81. 
Only half of the countries achieved the negotiated credit ceilings. Moreover, compliance with 
fiscal targets has been poor. According to Edwards (1989), conditions on the government’s 
deficit have been achieved in only 30 percent of 34 programs approved in 1983. In 1984 
compliance was reduced further: the ceiling was observed in only 19 percent of the programs. 
One year later, 57 percent of these countries failed to comply. As for changes in domestic 
credit, compliance was highest in 1983 (54.8 percent). It reduced to 46.4 percent in 1984 and 
40.9 percent in 1985. On average, compliance was higher for changes in net domestic credit 
to the government with 72 percent in 1983 and about 52 percent in 1984 and 1985. This study 
has been updated by Polak (1991), who added programs in place between 1988 and 1989. 
According to his results, compliance with fiscal and credit targets has been 40 percent for the 
17 SAF programs and 60 percent for the five ESAF programs included in the study. 
Mecagni (1999) evaluated 36 countries with an IMF program under the Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF) or the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) approved 
between 1986 and end-94. His findings show that 28 of the evaluated countries interrupted 
their programs 51 times in total. 17 countries had more than one interruption. Only 10 
programs were in effect for three or four years without any major interruption and policy 
slippage. 38 programs made it at least one year, in the second year, 22 programs remained in   4
 
effect. 33 interruptions were caused by slippage on conditionality; only eight programs broke 
down due to disagreements about future actions. In some cases, governments needed more 
time to get political support in their countries in favor of an IMF program. In 1988-89, only 
40 percent of 17 countries with an SAF program complied with the postulated credit ceiling. 
The same is true for the overall fiscal deficit. In ten of the reviewed interruption episodes 
there were political upheavals. Governments were therefore not able to make credible 
commitments.  
Edwards (2001a) analyzed 347 programs between 1979 and 1997. He gathered 
information from different sources, including the Fund’s archives, on whether a program was 
suspended. His data is reproduced in Table 1, alongside other measures of interruptions that 
will be introduced below. As can be seen in column 1, interruptions have been particularly 
frequent between 1988-1991. Over the whole period of study, 138 programs have been 
suspended prior to expiration. This corresponds to a completion rate of 60 percent. 
Analyzing the reasons for low completion rates, Edwards finds that international 
power, proxied by a country’s quota with the Fund, reduced the likelihood of program 
suspension. Edwards (2001b) reports that the IMF is more likely to suspend programs in 
democratic countries having fractionalized legislatures and proportional representation 
systems.  
(Table 1 here) 
Since the beginning of the Nineties the IMF itself provides data on compliance with 
conditionality. Its database on Monitoring Fund Arrangements (MONA) contains data on the 
implementation of performance criteria and structural benchmarks that have been 
implemented under its programs. Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2004) use these data to 
give evidence on compliance in countries in transition to market economies. Of the 33 
countries analyzed, only 17 implemented more than 50 percent of the structural benchmarks 
included in their program between 1993-97. The IMF (2001) itself reports compliance with 
structural benchmarks in 57 percent of all programs between 1987-99. Compliance with 
performance criteria was almost ten percentage points higher, while prior actions have been 
implemented in 80 percent of the programs analyzed. The worst implementation rates were 
found for conditions relating to privatization (45 percent), the social security system (56 
percent) and public enterprise reforms (57 percent). However, reasons for non-compliance 
have been evaluated only for a small subset of countries. In these countries, political and 
social opposition were major reasons for observed non-implementation. Ivanova, Mayer, 
Mourmouras and Anayiotos (2003) report that program implementation depends primarily on   5
 
political constellations in the borrower country. Compliance is shown to be lower with 
stronger special interests, less political stability, inefficient bureaucracies, lack of political 
cohesion and greater ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Similar results are reported by Nsouli, 
Mourmouras and Atoian (2005). Their data is shown in column 2 of Table 1. 
Unfortunately, the MONA data are not without problems (Bird and Willett 2004). 
Only those programs are included in the database, which have been reviewed by the 
Executive Board. Programs that are interrupted or permanently cancelled will therefore not be 
covered – which is likely to overstate compliance. As another problem, these data do not take 
the importance of conditions into account. If the borrower implements many minor conditions 
but fails to implement the important ones, compliance might nevertheless be classified as 
being high. Moreover, the database does not cover a sufficient number of years to allow 
longer-term economic analysis.  
The most widely used measure of program implementation has been a proxy suggested 
by Killick (1995). He employed IMF loans agreed but left undrawn at program expiration as 
an indicator of performance under a program. Column 3 of Table 1 contains the share of 
programs in effect in a certain year where more than 25 percent of the agreed money remain 
undrawn at program expiration. 
Killick (1995) gives evidence that highly indebted countries as well as countries with 
small amounts of IMF credit are less likely to complete a program and that fiscal conditions 
are especially unlikely to be met. He also stresses that new programs are approved for 
political reasons even if non-compliance with conditionality of previous ones is evident. 
Results similar to those of Killick are reported by Mussa and Savastano (1999). Employing 
the same proxy, Joyce (2003) showed that a country’s trade openness, its government’s 
ideological cohesion, the duration of its political regime and its degree of political openness 
are significant determinants of program implementation. 
Bird and Willett (2004) summarize the disadvantages of this approach. Resources may 
not be withdrawn, because of improvements in the economy. Sometimes programs are 
approved on a precautionary basis only, without intensions to draw at all. On the other hand, 
the Fund might disburse its money even though implementation of conditions has been poor, 
for example because it feels that significant progress has been made, or even for political 
reasons. There is an additional shortcoming (Dreher 2003). If countries fail to implement 
program conditions at the beginning of a multi-year arrangement, money will be withheld. In 
many cases this money will be paid out later, after agreement about future conditions is   6
 
                                                
reached. Though non-compliance might be severe during major parts of the program period, 
finally the whole amount is disbursed, what would not be reflected by Killick’s indicator. 
In order to make up for this shortcoming, Dreher (2003) proposes a slightly revised 
proxy. After concluding an arrangement, part of the credit associated with it will be paid out 
immediately. The rest is payable in tranches. Since IMF credits are highly subsidized for most 
borrowers, countries have incentives to draw all the money available immediately. However, 
the money is conditional on observance of several performance criteria. Unless a waiver is 
granted, non-compliance results in program interruptions. If there are large unused credit 
lines, non-compliance is likely to be the cause. Therefore, Dreher (2003) proxied compliance 
using a dummy which takes the value of one if in a certain year at most 25 percent of the 
amount which would be available for that year under equal phasing remained undrawn and 
zero otherwise. Column 4 of Table 1 reports the percentage of programs interrupted according 
to that proxy. According to Dreher (2003) compliance depends negatively on government 
consumption, short-term debt and positively on GDP per capita. Compliance has also been 
found to be lower before national elections. 
 
3. IMF AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Starting in the 1970s, the IMF “placed increasing emphasis on economic growth as a 
policy objective. Growth became increasingly prominent as an objective in the 1980s”.
2 Since 
then, IMF Managing Directors Michael Camdessus and Horst Köhler further highlighted the 
IMF’s role in economic growth (Hardoy 2003). 
Whether the IMF indeed influences economic growth has been subject to a huge 
number of studies.
3 In principle, three methods of evaluation have been employed. First, 
before-after analysis compares economic growth before the IMF program has been approved 
with its value after the program period. Differences are then attributed to the program. 
Obviously, this method has its drawbacks. Participation in IMF programs is not exogenous 
but usually consequence of a crisis. In attributing all changes in growth over the program 
period to the IMF, the Fund’s effects are probably judged too negatively.  
A second approach to evaluate the IMF’s impact on growth has been to compare 
growth rates in program countries with the development of growth in a control group (with-
without approach). Exogenous shocks hitting not only program countries but countries in the 
 
2 Cited in Hardoy (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/overview/index.htm. 
3 For a detailed summary of the IMF’s impact on economic outcomes see Haque and Khan (1998) or Bird 
(2001).   7
 
                                                
control group as well would then not distort results. The problem, of course, is finding an 
adequate control group. Ideally, for each program country there should be a control country in 
exactly the same initial position. Programs are not randomly distributed over member 
countries, however, but are chosen from countries with specific characteristics. As Santaella 
(1996) has shown, the initial situation of program countries differs greatly from non-program 
countries. Even if the control-group would be chosen according to economic indicators, the 
most important difference could not be accounted for: The decision to negotiate an IMF 
program in the first place.
4 
The third method is regression analysis – it has been used by most recent studies. 
When endogeneity of the IMF-related variables is carefully taken into account, this method 
seems to be the most promising one. However, solving the endogeneity problem is not 
straightforward. Most of the older studies did not even try to solve this problem,
5 while more 
recent ones like Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Barro and Lee (2005) take endogeneity 
into account. None of the existing studies, however, adequately separates the effects of the 
IMF’s advice and compliance with conditionality from money disbursed.
6 
As can be seen in Table 2, existing studies do not provide a clear answer as to whether 
IMF programs affect growth and, if so, whether they increase or reduce growth rates. In part, 
this conflicting evidence arises from differences in country coverage, sample periods and 
methodology employed. However, even with similar samples and methodology, contradictory 
results emerge.  
(Table 2 here) 
 
 
4 However, countries could be matched according to the probability of being under a program. See Atoyan and 
Conway (2005). 
5 Conway (1994) is a noteworthy exception.  
6 Hutchison and Noy (2003) include their measures of implementation only separately but not in addition to the 
IMF program variable and exclude money disbursed altogether. Their measure of implementation could thus 
reflect the average effect of compliance with conditionality and negative incentives due to increased budgetary 
leeway.   8
 
                                                
4. CHANNELS FOR THE IMPACT OF THE IMF ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
There is a multitude of channels by which the IMF can influence economic outcomes. 
First, program approval is obviously associated with a certain amount of money.
7 The effect 
of this money is, however, not evident. While, in theory, IMF credit is meant to alleviate 
restructuring the economy, in practice the result might be the exact opposite: Money 
disbursed increases borrowing governments’ leeway, thus reducing incentives to reform 
(Boockmann and Dreher 2003). As a consequence, governments pursue inappropriate policies 
longer than they would otherwise (Bandow 1994).
8 
Second, availability of IMF money may deteriorate economic policy even before it has 
been disbursed. According to the "moral-hazard hypothesis", IMF lending may be interpreted 
as a (subsidized) income insurance against adverse shocks (Vaubel 1983). The insurance 
cover induces the potential recipients to excessively lower their precautions against such 
damages (or even to intentionally generate a crisis). There is a considerable body of evidence 
that the balance of payments problems of IMF borrowers have been largely of their own 
making
9 and that macroeconomic performance during inter-program years has been 
deteriorating as the number of past programs increased.
10 As has been shown by Dreher and 
Vaubel (2004a), economic policy is indeed more expansive in countries with higher IMF 
loans available (as measured by the country’s undrawn resources with the Fund). If it is true 
that the IMF induces moral hazard and thus “bad” economic policy, reduced growth would be 
the consequence. 
Third, the Fund attaches policy conditions to its loans. Those conditions contain 
measures the Fund believes to be adequate to overcome crisis and stimulate growth. However, 
IMF conditionality has frequently been criticized as inappropriate.
11 If this is true, 
implementation of those conditions might actually reduce growth. Moreover, it has been 
shown that non-compliance and program interruptions are quite frequent (see section 2). If 
 
7 In addition to the Fund’s own resources, IMF programs might exert a catalytic effect on other financial flows. 
Empirical support for this hypothesis is, however, rather weak. For an excellent summary of this literature see 
Bird and Rowlands (2002). 
8 According to Veiga (2005), existence of IMF arrangements in high inflation periods reduces the probability of 
stabilization, while the result of money disbursed is ambiguous and depends on the timing of disbursements. 
9 See the sources quoted in Vaubel (1991, p. 205, pp. 207) and Evrensel (2002, Table 2). 
10 Evrensel (2002) shows that budget deficits, inflation rates and domestic credit, among others, are higher in the 
second inter-program-period compared with the first. According to Conway (1994), participation in IMF 
programs is more likely, the more frequently the country participated in the past. 
11 For a summary of this literature see Bird (1986). More recent contributions are Feldstein (1998) and Meltzer 
(2005). See Krueger (2005) for a defense of the Fund.   9
 
                                                
conditions are not implemented, of course, they cannot have any (direct) impact on economic 
outcomes.
12 
A fourth channel by which the IMF can influence growth is its policy advice 
(Boockmann and Dreher 2003). Advice of the IMF is often discussed publicly and may 
influence politics in the longer run (Killick 1994: 156). According to Fischer (2001: 237), one 
of the IMF’s main contributions to reforms is that it stands consistently for a particular 
approach to economic policy. Therefore, the long-run impact of the IMF reaches beyond the 
immediate effects of conditions and finance. IMF advice to policymakers might thus stimulate 
(or reduce) growth independent of policy conditionality. 
 
5. METHOD AND DATA 
The regression is a pooled time-series cross-section analysis. Following Barro and Lee 
(2005), the data are averages over five years. This allows inclusion of variables that are not 
available on a yearly basis. The analysis covers the time period 1970-2000 and extends to 98 
developing countries.
13 Since some of the data are not available for all countries or periods, 
the panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of 
explanatory variables.  
The dependent variable is the average five-year growth rate of per capita GDP. All 
regressions include similar covariates as Barro and Lee (2005): The log of per capita GDP at 
the beginning of each period, measures for human resources (secondary school enrollment, 
life expectancy, fertility rate), lagged values of investment and government consumption 
(both in percent of GDP), the rate of inflation, the growth rate of the terms of trade (all World 
Bank data) and an index of globalization (Dreher 2005).
14 A dummy for each country and 
each of the five-year-periods is included in all regressions. 
As has been argued in section 4, the IMF might influence growth via its advice, 
conditionality, money, and moral hazard it induces with the borrowing governments. Only 
one of those channels can be directly measured: IMF loans disbursed (in percent of GDP). To 
 
12 Marchesi and Thomas (1999) develop a model where the adoption of an IMF program signals a country’s 
productivity. Dreher (2004c) shows that conditionality can help voters in extracting the ‘type’ of their 
government. Independent of compliance with conditions, there might thus be indirect effects on economic (and 
political) outcomes. 
13 Country selection is driven by data availability. The countries included in this study are listed in Appendix C. 
14 A previous version of the paper also included an index for the rule of law. It has been, however, insignificant 
in all specifications and omitting it substantially increased the number of observations. The main results are 
unchanged.   10
 
                                                
proxy the degree of implementation of conditionality,
15 five-year averages of three different 
variables introduced in section 2 are employed. First, I use the dummy for suspension of IMF 
programs constructed by Edwards (2001a). Second, I employ the share of the agreed money 
actually disbursed, which has been introduced by Killick (1995) as measure of compliance 
with conditionality. The third measure is the dummy proposed in Dreher (2003). It is one, if at 
most 25 percent of the amount which would be available for a certain year under equal 
phasing remained undrawn and zero otherwise.
16 The underlying data are shown in columns 
1, 3 and 4 of Table 1. As can be seen from the Table, however, the different proxies do not 
provide a consistent picture. It has been outlined in section 2 that, clearly, all of them have 
their drawbacks, and it is therefore not obvious, which one is the most adequate measure of 
compliance. The results of the empirical analysis thus have to be interpreted cautiously. 
In principle, the amount of IMF credit a country receives may also proxy the direct 
effect of advice on policies. However, advice and credit volumes are probably not 
proportional. The number of arrangements in effect might thus be a better measure for advice 
than the flows of money (Boockmann and Dreher 2003). Controlling for the amount of credit 
and compliance with conditionality, the dummy for existing IMF programs would in part 
capture the effect of advice. 
Whether the IMF induces moral hazard with its borrowers can not be tested directly 
with those data.
17 To some extent, however, the existence of an IMF program could create 
incentives to run “bad” economic policy in order to stay eligible for IMF money. 
The analysis should cover only those arrangements that were in effect over much of 
the year in question. Only those years are thus coded as program years where an arrangement 
has been active over at least five months in a given calendar year. 
Since the data are five-year averages, the participation index varies continuously 
between zero and one, measuring the fraction of each period that a country operates under an 




15 One would also like to control for the degree of conditionality. Dreher (2004b) and Dreher and Vaubel 
(2004b) used the number of conditions included in the IMF program as proxy. However, those data are not 
available for a sufficient number of years and can therefore not be used here. 
16 I do not employ the data of Nsouli, Mourmouras and Atoian (2005) for the empirical analysis since they cover 
only nine years. 
17 In their study of fiscal and monetary policy Dreher and Vaubel (2004a) used a country’s undrawn quota with 
the Fund to test for moral hazard. I do not use this variable here, since the effect of moral hazard on economic 
growth can only be an indirect one.  
18 Over the period of study, 512 country-years have been at least five months under an IMF Stand-By program, 
157 under an EFF arrangement. Only 16 countries in the sample never participated in a program, 9 countries 
have been under a program for at least 15 years. Since the objectives of the Fund’s concessional facilities are   11
 
                                                                                                                                                        
When estimating the growth regressions by OLS, however, there might be a problem 
with the endogeneity of the IMF variables.
19 Obviously, IMF programs are usually concluded 
in times of economic crises. The effect reported for the program variable might thus not 
reflect the consequences of the program itself but those of the underlying crisis. In other 
words, there might be a selection problem.
20 The same is true for the amount of money 
agreed, which probably rises with the severity of a crisis. Endogeneity due to self selection 
might even be a problem with the compliance variables. As an additional source of bias, the 
decision to participate in the IMF program might have an influence on other determinants of 
growth, like, e.g., policy instruments, also. 
There are various methods to deal with the selection problem, and the literature on the 
IMF is rich on applications. Most studies pursue either some variant of Heckman’s (1979) 
estimator or an instrumental variables approach; recently the method of matching has also 
been applied.
21 All three of those approaches have their benefits, but also imply drawbacks. 
Estimating the participation equation and then including the inverse Mills ratio, as suggested 
by Heckman (1979), depends implicitly on auxiliary restrictions like assumptions about the 
distribution of error terms (Barro and Lee 2005) and the ‘correct’ specification of the 
participation equation. The challenge with the instrumental variables approach, clearly, is in 
finding variables that affect the probability of program participation but do not affect 
economic growth other than through their impact on participation. The problem of finding the 
correct variables is even more severe with respect to the matching approach, where matching 
of “treatment” and “control” groups would only result in unbiased estimates, when the 
decision to enter IMF programs could be accounted for by the matching procedure (see 
Przeworski and Limongi 1996). On theoretical grounds, thus, the choice of method is not 
obvious. For three reasons I chose the instrumental variables approach. First, there are 
 
different from those of Stand-By and EFF arrangements, pooling them is not adequate. As an additional reason 
to focus on Stand-By and EFF programs, Edward’s measure of suspension is only available for these 
unconcessional facilities. 
19 This is especially true since the study employs data which is averaged over five years, so low growth at the 
beginning of a period might cause, e.g., program participation at the end. 
20 Vreeland (2003) provides an extensive discussion of the selection problem in the context of IMF programs. 
For a detailed representation of the underlying formula, see Goldstein and Montiel (1986) or Atoyan and 
Conway (2005). 
21 With respect to the IMF and economic growth, the Heckman methodology has been employed, among others, 
by Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Hutchison (2003). However, this method usually performs poorly, with 
an inverse Mills ratio not significantly different from zero (Hutchison and Noy 2003, Hutchison 2004). Hardoy 
(2003) and Hutchison (2004) use ‘matching’ as their preferred choice, while Atoyan and Conway (2005) 
compare results derived with the method of matching with those from employing the IV estimator. Barro and 
Lee (2005), Easterly (2005) and Nsouli, Mourmouras and Atoian (2005) apply an instrumental variables 
approach. The latter approach seems to be the most popular in estimating the impact of the IMF on economic 
and political variables (a selection of recent papers is Marchesi 2003, Li 2003, Jensen 2004, Dreher 2004c and 
Dreher and Vaubel 2004b).    12
 
                                                
instruments available for participation in IMF programs. Second, the focus of this study is not 
only on IMF programs, but on loans and compliance also. Estimating the relevant equations 
simultaneously is thus preferable. And third, the Heckman approach is best when the selection 
variable is dichotomous, while the instrumental variables approach is preferable when the 
selection variables are continuous, which is the case for two of the three variables considered 
here. 
Section 6 presents two sets of regression results explaining economic growth. First, the 
growth equations are estimated employing Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) taking 
equations explaining IMF programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality into account. 
The SUR estimator is consistent and more efficient as compared to OLS. Second, I replicate 
the SUR analysis using instruments for the IMF variables. I follow Barro and Lee (2005) to 
account for the endogeneity of the IMF-variables and estimate 3SLS regressions. This 
procedure is consistent and, in general, asymptotically more efficient than 2SLS. Since the 
predicted values of the IMF variables are used instead of the actual data, 3SLS is fully 
adequate to account for the selection problem. The covariates most likely to be affected by the 
IMF variables – investment and government consumption – are instrumented with their own 
lagged values to account for potential simultaneity. 
As possible determinants of programs, loans, and compliance, a huge number of 
variables has been suggested in the literature: the rate of monetary expansion, the overall 
budget deficit, general government consumption relative to GDP, real GDP growth, GDP per 
capita, the share of foreign short-term debt in total foreign debt, the total level of outstanding 
debt, total debt service (in percent of GDP), the rate of inflation, a country’s international 
reserves (in months of imports), the current account balance as a percent of GDP, openness to 
trade (all World Bank data) and the LIBOR on three months credits to US banks (IMF 2003). 
The following political and social variables have been suggested: the degree of democracy 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2000), a measure of political instability (Dreher 2005),
22 
fractionalization of the legislature, proportional representation, a dummy for special interest 
governments, government ideological cohesion, and the duration of the political regime (all 
from Beck et al. 2001).  
The initial regressions explaining the IMF variables included all those variables at the 
same time. All regressions also include a dummy for each individual country; where 
 
22 The index is constructed using principal components analysis. It employs the following categories: 
assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crisis, riots and revolutions. Since those variables are 
highly collinear, they should not be included all separately in one regression.   13
 
                                                
necessary an AR(1) term is included to correct for serial correlation.
23 From the initial 
regressions I followed a general to specific approach, consecutively eliminating the variables 
with the lowest t-value.
24 Eventually, only determinants significant at least at the ten percent 
level are retained in the regressions.  
Regarding the instrumental variables estimates, the obvious problem is finding reliable 
instruments.
25 One instrument typically employed in the literature is a variable measuring 
voting in the UN General Assembly (e.g. Barro and Lee 2005).
26 As in Dreher and Sturm 
(2005) I construct a variable reflecting whether the borrowing country votes in line with the 
average of the G7 countries. As it is the G7 who are in control of the Fund, closer allies are 
expected to receive more programs and larger loans. G7 countries’ votes are weighted with 
their quota in the Fund to take their voting power into account. Votes in agreement with the 
G7 are coded as 1 and votes in disagreement as 0 – the resulting numbers are then divided by 
the total number of votes in each year. In addition to the UN voting variable, potential 
instruments are derived from the general-to-specific approach described above. 
The next section reports the empirical results. After shortly summarizing the results 
for IMF loans, programs, and compliance with conditionality, results for the IMF’s impact on 
economic growth are presented. 
 
6. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES 
Tables 3 and 4 report results for the IMF variables. As can be seen, only three 
variables have been found to be significant predictors of Fund programs. Programs are more 
likely the lower a country’s short-term debt, the higher its debt service paid and the less 
democratic the country. The result for democracy is in line with those of other researchers 
claiming that the Fund uses its credit to support undemocratic regimes (Edwards and Santaella 
1993, Bandow 1994 and Vreeland 2003). This result remains when GDP per capita and other 
variables controlling for development are included in the regression (not reported in the 
Table). A higher debt service increases demand for IMF programs and, as Dreher and Vaubel 
(2004a) point out, higher short-term debt probably reduces the IMF’s supply. Note, however, 
 
23 Since the variables are bounded by zero and one, I also ran Tobit regressions. The results are very similar to 
the within-groups regressions, so I do not report them in the tables of section 6. 
24 This is standard procedure. See, e.g. Sturm, Berger and de Haan (2005). 
25 Although there is now a huge literature on the determinants of IMF involvement, the reasons for adopting a 
program or complying with program conditions are still not well understood. Clearly, this implies limitations for 
the instrumental variables approach. 
26 According to Barro and Lee (2005), a country’s share of quotas and staff with the Fund influence the size and 
frequency of IMF loans. I cannot employ the former in a fixed effects specification, since it varies only slightly 
over time; the latter is not publicly available.   14
 
                                                
that these results are not directly comparable to most previous studies, since the variables are 
averaged over five years.
27 
(Table 3 here) 
Table 3 also shows the results for IMF loans (as a percent of GDP). Loans rise 
significantly with higher LIBOR, lower political stability and better rule of law. They are 
significantly lower when the government party belongs to a special interest group. Most of 
those results are straightforward. LIBOR proxies interest rates in the world capital markets; 
with rising interest rates the interest rate subsidy provided by the Fund increases and its loans 
become more attractive.
28 Better rule of law and lower dependence of a country’s government 
on special interests probably increase the IMF’s supply, whereas political instability is a 
proxy for the severity of a crisis. 
Note that the explanatory variables are jointly significant at the one percent level in 
both regressions of Table 3. However, the explained share of the dependent variable’s 
variation is rather low. 
With respect to the compliance indices (Table 4), results are somewhat disappointing. 
No clear pattern emerges as to what factors are important for compliance among the three 
different measures employed. However, the explanatory variables are jointly significant at the 
one percent level in all three regressions.
29 
(Table 4 here) 
Program continuation is more likely with more foreign direct investment in the 
program country, greater freedom of the press and better rule of law. The results are easy to 
explain: Inflows of investment lead to (or signal) economic recovery, which makes 
compliance with conditionality easier, thus reducing probability of program suspension.
30 An 
independent and free press is essential to provide access to information about development 
policy, creating support for reforms, therefore making program suspension less likely. A 
better rule of law also makes compliance more likely. As proxied by the index measuring 
equally spaced disbursement, compliance is significantly higher with a lower rate of monetary 
expansion, higher inflation, lower GDP per capita, higher trade volume, higher school 
enrollment, greater political instability and more civil liberties. Reducing monetary expansion 
 
27 For a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of IMF programs and loans employing yearly data see 
Sturm, Berger and de Haan (2005). 
28 Since 1990, however, the rates of charge have been linked to short-term market interest rates in the main 
industrial countries so that the subsidy is fairly constant for short-term loans.  
29 Note that in the compliance-regressions only those countries and periods were included where an IMF 
program has been in effect. 
30 In theory, compliance could also induce inflows of fdi, so the result might be due to reversed causality. 
However, the empirical literature fails to identify a catalyzing role of the IMF (e.g. Bird and Rowlands 2002).   15
 
is usually included as a performance criterion in Fund programs – high expansion thus 
induces the IMF to hold its money back. High inflation, low political stability and reductions 
in per capita GDP indicate the severity of the crisis and tend to increase compliance. The 
positive influence of school enrollment and civil liberties is also easy to explain: A better 
educated and free society better understands and participates in policy making processes, thus 
increasing the chance for reforms.  
The share of money disbursed relative to money agreed over the five-year-period is 
significantly higher in more democratic countries and when inflation is low. Democratic 
governments frequently include conditions in IMF programs which serve their own interests 
(Vreeland 1999). This is because they can then blame the IMF for their policies (“scapegoat 
hypothesis”). Compliance is thus more likely. High inflation, to the contrary, makes 
compliance more difficult. 
Turning to economic growth, Table 5 reports the SUR results, where information from 
the regressions above is taken into account in estimating the growth regressions. As can be 
seen, most explanatory variables have the expected sign. In all or most specifications, growth 
rates significantly rise with lower initial GDP, longer life expectancy, lower fertility rates, an 
improvement in the terms of trade, and lower inflation. Globalization significantly promotes 
growth in some but not all regressions, while secondary school enrollment, (lagged) 
government consumption and (lagged) investment are never significant at the five percent 
level. 
(Table 5 here) 
Regarding the influence of the IMF, the results show that economic growth tends to be 
lower with greater IMF involvement. When Fund programs are included as the only IMF 
variable, the coefficient is negative and significant at the ten percent level. As can be seen 
from the table, IMF loans (in percent of GDP) are never significant at conventional levels. To 
the contrary, all three measures of compliance show a negative coefficient when included 
individually. The share of agreed IMF loans actually disbursed over the program period 
(column 3a) and compliance as measured with Edward’s index (column 3b) reduce growth at 
the one percent level of significance, and the measure of equally phased disbursements 
(column 3c) is significant at the ten percent level. This negative impact of compliance is easy 
to explain. When the program variable is not included, the negative impact of IMF 
involvement is reflected by the compliance measures. However, while the impact of 
compliance becomes insignificant in columns 4a and 4b when the variable is interacted with 
the program variable and the program and loan variables are also included, the significantly   16
 
                                                
negative coefficient of column 3c remains. The explanation might be that IMF conditions are 
harmful to growth, so that compliance with those conditions worsens performance. This is 
particularly likely in the short run where a devaluation of the domestic currency and tight 
fiscal and monetary policy have for a long time been the preferred measures to deal with 
balance-of-payments crises. 
Table 6 presents results when IMF programs, loans, and compliance with 
conditionality are instrumented. In addition to the UN-General-Assembly-voting variable 
introduced above some of the variables of Tables 3 and 4 are employed as instruments. IMF 
programs are instrumented with short-term debt, total debt service, and the index of 
democracy; IMF loans with LIBOR, political instability and the dummy for special interest 
governments; the index for no program suspension with foreign direct investment and the 
freedom of the press index; equally phased loan disbursements with monetary expansion, 
GDP per capita, trade, political instability and civil liberties; and the share of agreed IMF 
loans drawn with the index of democracy. Note that the instrumental variables are jointly 
insignificant when included in the growth regressions directly. F-tests show that the 
instruments are jointly significant in explaining the respective IMF variable in all but one of 
the regressions, conditioned on the full information set in the final (second stage) 
specification. The exception is the measure of equally phased disbursements where the 
instruments are jointly insignificant. In addition, the Sargan test conducted to ensure that the 
instruments are not correlated with the error term of the growth regression does not accept this 
specification (while all other specifications are accepted). As I have thus no proper 
instruments for this variable, no results are reported in the table. 
(Table 6 here) 
Instruments for the covariates are the actual values of the variables for school 
enrollment, inflation, life expectancy, globalization, fertility and the growth rate of the terms 
of trade; lagged values of investment and government consumption; and the initial value of 
each period of per capita GDP.  
As the results of Table 6 show, program participation reduces growth in all 
regressions, with a coefficient significant at the five percent level at least. Compliance 
increases growth in the full model of columns 4a and 4b.
31 Again, the amount of loans has no 
significant impact in the full model. When included individually, growth is lower with higher 
loans, with a coefficient significant at the ten percent level. At the five percent level, the same 
 
31 Note that the result is not due to multicollinearity among the IMF program and compliance variables. 
Correlation between these variables is below 0.1.   17
 
is true for the compliance measure of Edward’s (column 3b). According to the estimates of 
column 4a, economic growth is on average 8.34 percentage points lower when an IMF 
program has been in effect over the whole five-year-period, which amounts to about 1.7 
percentage points per year. This is in line with the results of previous studies, estimating the 
costs of IMF programs in terms of foregone output to be in the range of 0.7-2.5 percentage 
points during each year of program participation (Hutchison 2004). If there has been full 
compliance over this period, the negative effect is reduced by 0.43 percentage points (or 
slightly more than 0.09 percentage points per year). The coefficients of column 4b are 
somewhat smaller in magnitude: The costs of an IMF program amount to 1.4 percent per year; 
compliance mitigates the negative impact by 0.02 percentage points. 
In summary, there is considerable evidence that participation in IMF programs reduces 
economic growth. There is also evidence that compliance with conditionality reduces this 
negative effect, although the overall impact remains substantially negative. 
The negative impact of IMF programs holding compliance and loans disbursed 
constant is not easy to explain. There are several possibilities. As argued above, this variable 
might measure the IMF’s advice (in excess of conditionality). The negative result would thus 
lead to the conclusion that the IMF’s concept of economic reforms is flawed and in the longer 
run, even when conditionality is not implemented, reduces growth. To some extent this 
negative impact might also reflect the effects of moral hazard. If the intention to sign an IMF 
program deteriorates economic policy, this would increase the probability of actual program 
approvals and, at the same time, would decrease economic growth. Similarly, in order to stay 
eligible for IMF money, necessary changes might be delayed. The existence of an IMF 
program could thus produce incentives to run “bad” economic policy and would so reduce 
growth.  
Alternatively, the program dummy might capture the short-term effect of demand 
compression that takes place very quickly, while the compliance measures pick up later 
adherence to the more structural aspects of policy conditions. 
As yet another, more technical, explanation, the instruments employed might not 
adequately capture the underlying crises, so that the effect of the IMF is outweighed by the 
effect of the crises. And finally, the proxies for compliance might be too crude to actually 
capture true implementation of conditionality. 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
“Our primary objective is growth” (Michael Camdessus, former IMF Managing 
Director, Statement before the United Nations Economic and Social Council in Geneva, July 
11, 1990, cited in Przeworski and Vreeland 2000). 
As has been shown in several studies, with respect to this objective, IMF programs are 
a failure. This paper provided further evidence. While supporting previous results on the 
negative relationship between IMF programs and economic growth, there is some evidence 
that compliance with IMF conditionality does increase growth rates once taking account of 
sample selection. In any case, the effect of compliance is quantitatively small compared to the 
overall reduction. Since IMF loans and compliance are controlled for in the empirical 
analysis, the remaining negative impact of IMF programs might probably either be due to 
“bad” advice given by the IMF or the moral hazard it induces with its borrowers. To further 
separate the components reflected by the program participation variable remains an interesting 
area for future research. 
The results have implications for the design of conditionality. Whether or not the IMF 
should impose conditions on sovereign countries has been highly debated from the very 
beginning of the IMF’s operations.
32 It has recently been shown that its conditions do not 
influence economic policy (Dreher and Vaubel 2004b). The empirical results of this paper 
have shown that the impact of compliance with conditionality on growth is quantitatively 
small. As one interpretation of this result, conditions imposed by outside actors might be 
circumvented, even if the officially agreed criteria have been met. To some extent, the results 
of this paper support Dollar and Svensson (2000), who show that governments which are 
inclined to reform must be identified and can not be created by international organizations. In 
order to lend more effectively, it would therefore be most important for the IMF to detect 
factors influencing ownership and thus the willingness to reform. Arguably, if the IMF would 
support reform-minded governments, its loans might make a difference (even if its advice 
might not). 
The results also allow a different interpretation. As claimed by the IMF, conditions are 
the outcome of a bargaining process between government and Fund.
33 They might therefore 
reflect the government’s agenda instead of being imposed by the IMF. As a consequence, 
compliance with conditionality does not make a difference with respect to economic growth – 
 
32 For a recent discussion of the theoretical arguments see Dreher and Vaubel (2004b). 
33 Conway (2003) provides empirical evidence in support of this claim.   19
 
the same policies would have been implemented without the Fund’s conditions. In any case 
conditionality would not be necessary.   20
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Table 1: Interruptions of IMF Stand-By and EFF Programs 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1970     57 65 
1971     58 37 
1972     54 61 
1973     70 47 
1974     44 35 
1975     58 63 
1976     64 53 
1977     56 46 
1978     69 52 
1979 18    52  71 
1980 33    56  68 
1981 40    62  68 
1982 31    21  65 
1983 36    39  57 
1984 39    48  49 
1985 39    42  55 
1986 43    30  73 
1987 37    48  67 
1988 49    19  64 
1989 48    58  80 
1990 56    78  62 
1991 45    59  63 
1992 39  33  48  58 
1993 29  33  29  71 
1994 22  55  38  72 
1995 21  39  22  72 
1996 33  50  39  77 
1997 67  29  29  69 
1998   40 30 57 
1999   57 57 61 
2000   40 60   
(1): Percentage of countries that were not 
eligible for all of the drawings either 
because they missed performance criteria 
and were unable to obtain a waiver from 
the Fund or they failed a quarterly review 
(Source: Edwards 2001a). 
 
(2): Percentage of programs approved, 
which were irreversibly interrupted 
during the intended period (Source: 
Nsouli, Mourmouras, Atoian 2005). 
 
(3): Percentage of programs in effect in a 
certain year where more than 25 percent 
of the agreed money remain undrawn at 
program expiration (Source: own 
calculations). 
 
(4): Percentage of programs where at 
least 25 percent of the amount which 
would be available for that year under 
equal phasing remained undrawn 
(Source: Dreher 2003). 
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Table 2: IMF and Economic Growth 







      
Reichman and Stillson (1978)  1963-72  79  n.a.  Increase 
Connors (1979)  1973-77  31  23  None 
Zulu and Nsouli (1985)  1980-81  35  22  None 
Killick (1986)  1974-79  38  24  None 
Pastor (1987)  1965-81  n.a.  18  None 
Killik, Malik and Manuel (1992)  1979-85  n.a.  16  Increase 
Schadler et al. (1993) 1983-93  55  19  Increase 
Evrensel (2002)  1971-97  n.a.  109  None 
Hardoy (2003)  1970-90  460  69  None 
With-without       
Donovan (1981)  1970-76  12  12  Increase 
Donovan (1982)  1971-80  78  44  Decrease 
Loxley (1984)  1971-82  38  38  None 
Gylfason (1987)  1977-79  32  14  None 
Faini et al. (1991)  1978-86  n.a.  93  None 
Hardoy (2003)  1970-90  460  69  None 
Hutchison (2004)  1975-97  455  25  None 
Atoyan and Conway (2005)  1993-2002 181  95  None 
Regression-based       
Goldstein and Montiel (1986) 1974-81  68  58  None 
Khan (1990)  1973-88  259  69  Decrease 
Doroodian (1993)  1977-83  27  43  None 
Conway (1994)  1976-86  217  73  Increase 
Bagci and Perraudin (1997)  1973-92  n.a.  68  Increase 
Bordo and Schwarz (2000)  1973-98  n.a.  24  Decrease 
Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000)  1986-91  88  74  Increase 
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000)  1970-90  465  135  Decrease 
Butkiewicz andYanikkaya (2003)  1970-99  407  n.a.  Decrease 
Hutchison (2003)  1975-97  461  67  Decrease 
Hutchison and Noy (2003)  1975-97  764  67  Decrease 
Nsouli, Mourmouras, Atoian (2005)  1992-2000 124  92  None 
Easterly (2005)  1980-99  107  107  None 
Atoyan and Conway (2005)  1993-2002 181  95  None 
Barro and Lee (2005)  1975-99  725  81  Decrease 
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Table 3: Determinants of IMF programs and loans (98 countries, 1970-2000, OLS) 
IMF programs in effect  IMF loans (in percent of GDP) 
      
Short-term debt (percent of total debt)  -0.01  LIBOR  1.60 
 (2.78***)    (4.42***)
Total debt service (in percent of GDP)  0.01  Political instability  26.10 
 (2.00**)    (4.42***)
Democracy, index  -0.02  Government special   -17.44 
  (2.43**)      interest  (1.82*) 
    Rule of law, index  3.12 
     (2.18**) 
      
Number of observations  351    299 
R² 0.07    0.13 
Joint significance (Prob>F)  0.000    0.000 
 
Notes: 
‘IMF programs’ is the five-year average of yearly dummies that take the value of one if 
there has been an IMF Stand-By or Extended Fund Facility arrangement in a certain year 
for at least five months. ‘IMF loans’ is the five-year average of disbursed loans in percent 
of GDP. 
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Levels of significance: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (*). 
The regressions include dummies for each country.   29
 
Table 4: Compliance with IMF conditionality (98 countries, 1970-2000, OLS) 
No program suspension  Equally phased loan 
disbursements 
Share of agreed IMF 
loans drawn 
          
Foreign direct investment   0.08  Monetary expansion  -0.0004  Inflation  -0.0003 
    (percent of GDP)  (2.07**)     (percent)  (2.04**)      (percent)  (2.04**) 
Freedom of the press,  0.01  Inflation  0.0002  Democracy,  0.04 
    index  (2.52**)     (percent)  (2.52**)      index  (3.42***)
Rule of law, index  0.06  GDP per capita  -0.02     
 (1.98**)    (1.72*)     
    Trade (percent of   0.27     
        GDP)  (2.42**)     
   School  enrollment  0.02     
          (1.88*)     
   Political  instability,  0.33     
        index  (1.89*)     
    Civil liberties, index  0.13     
     (2.39**)     
          
Number of observations  114    107    215 
R² 0.21    0.49    0.10 
Joint significance 
(Prob>F) 
0.006   0.000    0.001 
 
Notes: 
‘No program suspension’ is the share of a five-year period where (according to 
Edwards 2001a) no program suspension occurred. ‘Equally phased loan 
disbursement’ is the five-year average of a dummy that is one when in a certain year 
at most 25 percent of the amount which would be available for that year under equal 
phasing remained undrawn and zero otherwise. ‘Share of agreed IMF loans drawn‘ is 
the share of money agreed under an IMF program actually drawn until program 
expiration. 
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Levels of significance: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (*). 
The regressions include dummies for each country.   30
 
Table 5: Effects of the IMF on Economic Growth (98 countries, 1970-2000, SUR) 
  1  2  3a 3b 3c 4a 4b 4c 
IMF Program  -0.91          -0.46  -0.27  -0.08 
 (1.93*)          (0.54)  (0.31)  (0.12) 
IMF Loans    0.0002        0.001  0.0001  0.001 
   (0.03)        (0.15)  (0.02)  (0.17) 
Compliance     -1.37  -1.00  -0.92       
     (3.83***) (2.80***) (1.90*)       
IMF Program *             -0.19  -0.03  -3.62 
    Compliance            (0.18)  (0.03)  (2.44**) 
Log (per capita GDP),  -11.89  -12.85  -11.82  -12.51  -10.31  -12.82  -13.21  -12.55 
     beginning of period  (5.92***)  (4.45***)  (6.31***) (6.34***) (5.39***) (4.45***) (4.43***) (4.34***)
Secondary School   -0.01  0.004  0.001  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.01 
    Enrollment  (0.23)  (0.13) (0.04) (0.60) (0.51) (0.34) (0.28) (0.19) 
Log (Life Expectancy)  5.57  11.91  6.52  3.07  6.77  13.20  14.09  11.54 
 (2.03**)  (1.90*)  (2.39**)  (0.84)  (2.51**) (2.10**) (2.13**) (1.80*) 
Log (Fertility Rate)  -4.64  -3.99  -4.55 -4.03 -3.70 -3.77 -3.62 -4.61 
 (2.69****)  (1.70*)  (2.78***) (2.28**) (2.25**)  (1.61)  (1.49)  (1.93*) 
Investment    -0.04  -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
    (t-1, in percent of GDP)  (1.14)  (0.52)  (1.82*)  (1.52)  (0.89)  (0.62)  (0.83)  (0.57) 
Government Consumption   -0.02  -0.007  0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.06  -0.07  -0.08 
    (t-1, in percent of GDP) (0.48)  (1.08)  (0.10) (0.53)  (0.46)  (0.96) (1.12) (1.31) 
Index of Globalization  1.14  0.81  1.28  1.23  0.61  0.85  0.70  0.81 
 (2.64***)  (1.44)  (3.10***) (2.79***) (1.53)  (1.44)  (1.17)  (1.38) 
Inflation Rate (percent)  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (4.06***)  (3.45***)  (4.84***) (2.96***) (3.62***) (3.62***)  (1.54)  (3.24***)
Growth Rate of Terms of   2.98  6.33  3.23  4.05  5.34  6.11  8.03  5.15 
    Trade  (1.41)  (2.32**)  (1.54)  (1.78*) (2.53**)  (2.23**)  (2.81***) (1.85*) 
Number  of  observations  318 226 336 298 325 225 218 220 
R²  0.62 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.66 0.64 0.65 
Notes:   
Compliance is proxied by the share of agreed IMF loans disbursed (3a, 4a), Edwards’ variable 
for program continuation (3b, 4b) and, respectively, the measure for equally phased 
disbursements (3c, 4c). 
 
Regressions estimated by SUR, taking information from the regressions of Tables 3 and 4 into 
account. 
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Levels of significance: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (*). 
All regressions include dummies for each time period and country. 
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Table 6: Effect of the IMF on Economic Growth (98 countries, 1970-2000, IMF variables 
instrumented, 3SLS) 
 1  2  3a  3b  4a  4b 
IMF Program  -5.68        -8.34  -6.76 
 (2.75***)        (2.24**)  (2.09**) 
IMF Loans    -0.03      -0.02  -0.01 
   (1.73*)      (1.14)  (0.62) 
Compliance     2.83  -5.51     
     (0.71)  (1.96**)     
IMF Program *           0.43  0.11 
    Compliance          (2.32**)  (3.00***) 
Log (per capita GDP),  -12.84  -12.63  -12.13  -12.75  -19.36  -15.68 
     beginning of period  (5.68***)  (4.27***) (6.11***) (6.05***) (3.88***) (4.05***) 
Secondary School   0.01  0.01  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.03 
    Enrollment  (0.35)  (0.17)  (0.63) (0.26) (0.10)  (0.58) 
Log (Life Expectancy)  6.90  12.04  4.53  2.82  24.05  22.09 
 (2.18**)  (1.87*)  (1.13)  (0.73)  (2.17**)  (2.25**) 
Log (Fertility Rate)  -5.69  -3.63 -4.82  -5.14 -3.43 -2.59 
 (2.97***)  (1.51)  (2.75***)  (2.41**)  (1.06)  (0.89) 
Investment (t-1,  -0.06  -0.03  -0.04  -0.06  -0.02  -0.05 
    in percent of GDP)  (1.50)  (0.67)  (1.26)  (1.67*)  (0.32)  (0.82) 
Gov. Consumption   -0.01  -0.06  -0.02  -0.03  -0.13  -0.09 
    (t-1, percent of GDP)  (0.21)  (0.94) (0.27)  (0.62) (1.47) (1.16) 
Index of Globalization  1.80  0.77  0.88  1.31  2.68  2.35 
 (2.71***)  (1.33)  (1.27)  (2.72***)  (1.77*)  (1.78*) 
Inflation Rate  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001  -0.001 
    (percent)  (4.12***)  (3.34***) (1.97**) (2.60**)  (2.71***) (3.77***) 
Growth Rate of Terms   2.14  6.37  3.00  2.22  1.42  3.83 
    of Trade  (0.90)  (2.28**) (1.36) (0.75) (0.33)  (0.99) 
Number of observations  318  226  336  298  197  197 
Joint sign. of instruments 
(Prob. > F) 
0.02 0.00 0.00  0.02     
Sargan Test (Prob. > F)  0.75  0.22  0.85  0.09     
R² 0.45  0.61  0.49  0.44  0.32  0.47 
Notes:  
Compliance is proxied by the share of agreed IMF loans disbursed (3a, 4a), and, respectively, 
Edwards’ variable for program continuation (3b, 4b). Results employing the measure for 
equally phased disbursements are not reported as the F-test and the Sargan test reject the 
instruments. 
 
All IMF variables are instrumented with voting in the UN General Assembly. Additional 
instruments are short-term debt, total debt service, democracy (IMF programs); LIBOR, 
political instability, dummy for special interest governments (IMF loans); foreign direct 
investment, freedom of the press (no program suspension); democracy (share of agreed IMF 
loans drawn). 
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Levels of significance: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (*). 
All regressions include dummies for each time period and country.   32
 
Appendix A: Definitions and data sources 
Variable Source  Definition 
IMF programs  IMF annual report, 
various years 
Dummy that equals one if an IMF 
program has been in effect for at least 5 
months in a specific year. 
IMF loans (percent of GDP)  World Bank (2002)  IMF purchases are total drawings on the 
General Resources Account of the IMF 
during the year specified, excluding 
drawings in the reserve tranche. 
No  program  suspension  Edwards  (2001a)  Dummy equals one if a country lost 
eligibility for further drawings. 
Equally phased 
disbursements 
Dreher (2003)  Percentage of programs where at most 25 
percent of the amount which would be 
available for that year under equal 
phasing remained undrawn. 
Share of agreed IMF loans 
actually drawn 
IMF  (2003)  Share of money agreed under an IMF 
program and actually drawn until 
program expiration. 
growth  World Bank (2003)  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
per capita based on constant local 
currency. 
Short-term debt (percent of 
total debt) 
World Bank (2003)  Short-term debt includes all debt having 
an original maturity of one year or less 
and interest in arrears on long-term debt. 
Total debt service (percent of 
GDP) 
World Bank (2003)  Total debt service is the sum of principal 
repayments and interest actually. 
Democracy Marshall  and 
Jaggers (2000) 
0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high) democracy 
score. Measures the general openness of 
political institutions. 
LIBOR  IMF  (2003)  London Inter-Bank Offer Rate on 3-
months deposits in the US dollar. 
Political Instability  Dreher (2002)  Index constructed with principal 
components analysis. The weights 
obtained for the components are 0.08 
(assassination), 0.1 (strikes), 0.25 
(guerrilla warfare), 0.15 (crisis), 0.16 
(riots) and 0.27 (revolutions). 
Government special interest  Beck et al. (2001)  Dummy, equals one if at least one 
government party is special interest. 
Rule of law  Gwartney and 
Lawson (2002) 
Measures the quality of the legal system 
and property rights. 
Foreign direct investment     
(percent of GDP) 
World Bank (2003)  Foreign direct investment is net inflows 
of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more 
of voting stock). 
Freedom of the press  Freedomhouse  See 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/ 
pressurvey.htm 
Monetary expansion  World Bank (2003)  Average annual growth rate in money 
and quasi money for end-of-year data.   33
 
Appendix A (continued) 
Inflation  World Bank (2003)  Consumer price index in percent. 
Trade (percent of GDP)  World Bank (2003)  Sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross 
domestic product. 
School enrollment  World Bank (2003)  Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total 
enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of 
education shown. Secondary education 
completes the provision of basic 
education that began at the primary level. 
Civil liberties  Freedomhouse 
(2000) 
Rates civil liberties with 1 representing 
the most free and 7 the least free  
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/ 
freeworld/2001/index.htm). 
Log (per capita GDP), 
beginning of period 
World Bank (2003)  GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. Data are 
for the end of each five-year period. 
Log (Life Expectancy)  World Bank (2003)  Life expectancy at birth indicates the 
number of years a newborn infant would 
live if prevailing patterns of mortality at 
the time of its birth were to stay the same 
throughout its life. 
Log (Fertility Rate)  World Bank (2003)  Represents  the  number  of  children  that 
would be born to a woman if she were to 
live to the end of her childbearing years 
and bear children in accordance with 
prevailing age-specific fertility rates. 
Investment (percent of GDP)  World Bank (2003)  Gross domestic investment. 
Government Consumption 
(percent of GDP) 
World Bank (2003)  All government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services 
(including compensation of employees). 
Index of Globalization  Dreher (2002)  Based on 23 variables that relate to 
different dimensions of globalization. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation 
(overall) 
IMF programs  0.23  0.32 
IMF loans (percent of GDP)  8.40  29.40 
No program suspension  0.69  0.37 
Equally phased disbursements  0.28  0.36 
Share of agreed IMF loans actually drawn  0.74  0.38 
growth 1.27  3.58 
Short-term debt (percent of total debt)  14.02  11.87 
Total debt service (percent of GDP)  5.80  4.70 
Democracy 3.38  3.72 
LIBOR 7.98  2.52 
Political Instability  0.25  0.38 
Government special interest  0.15  0.34 
Rule of law  4.72  1.58 
Foreign direct investment (percent of GDP)  1.13  1.56 
Freedom of the press  54.09  31.15 
Monetary expansion  57.53  250.27 
Inflation 68.57  418.72 
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Appendix C: Countries included in the analysis 
 
    
Albania   Jordan 
Algeria   Kenya 
Argentin   Korea, Republic 
Bahamas   Kuwait 
Bahrain   Latvia 
Bangladesh   Lithuania 
Barbados   Madagascar 
Belize   Malawi 
Benin   Malaysia 
Bolivia   Mali 
Botswana   Malta 
Brazil   Mauritius 
Bulgaria   Mexico 
Burundi   Morocco 
Cameroon   Myanmar 
Central   Namibia 
Chad   Nepal 
Chile   Nicaragua 
China    
Colombia    
Congo, Democratic Republic    
Congo, Republic    
Costa Rica    
Cote d' Ivoire    
Croatia    
Cyprus    
Czech Republic    
Dominica    
Ecuador    
Egypt    
El Salvador    
Estonia    
Fiji    
Gabon    
Ghana    
Guatemala    
Guinea-Bissau    
Guyana    
Haiti    
Honduras    
Hungary    
India    
Indonesi    
Iran    
Israel    
Jamaica    
 